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Objectual Attitudes and Intentional Objects: A Theory of Incomplete Objects
Le Quyen Vu Pham
People can look for, want, fear or imagine actual, particular things; things in general;
things that do not exist; or things that cannot exist. Sally may be looking for this dog, Fido; fear
dogs but no specific one; want Snoopy the dog in her favorite comic; or, arguably, imagine a dog
that is not a canine. This paper is about the objects of nonspecific searches, as opposed to
searches for particular actual or particular fictional objects, such as Fido or Snoopy. The
proposed account will be generalizable to other fulfillment-based objectual intentional attitudes. I
will defend two theses: first, that to be a searcher is to stand in a relation to the intentional object
of the search; and second, that intentional objects of nonspecific search are a particular sort of
ontological entities, namely abstract, nonmental, and incompletely determined objects.

The first section will introduce the puzzle of intentional acts or states and their putative
objects. The second section will be a critical survey of different approaches to answering the
question about the nature of intentional objects, in which I will argue for my first thesis, that
there is a real, nonmental intentional entity which the person holding the intentional attitude is in
a relation with. The second thesis, my own account of what such an object may be, will be
developed in the third section.

I.

Certain acts or states such as wanting, seeking and fearing, and verbs which express these
acts or states, unlike acts or states like buying and finding and the corresponding verbs
expressing them, present linguistically and philosophically interesting puzzles. On the one hand,
some kinds of inference that are valid for statements about buying and finding are not valid for
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statements about wanting and seeking, such as substitution by coextensive terms and existential
generalization. On the other hand, certain kinds of inference that seem intuitively legitimate need
to be accounted for.

I will use the term intentional attitudes for acts or states that are about, represent or stand
for things or properties, such as wanting, seeking, fearing, and so on. Following standard
practice, I will call the verbs expressing them intensional verbs, such as ‘want,’ ‘seek,’ and
‘fear,’ to contrast with extensional verbs, such as ‘buy,’ ‘find,’ and ‘see.’1
While we cannot buy, find or see something that does not exist, it seems that we can
want, seek or fear things that do not exist. There is, at least at the surface level, something that
these intentional attitudes are “about,” an object of some sort of the act or state, or an object for
the subject, something that we can say does not exist or cannot exist. I will label this sort of
theoretical object the intentional object of the intentional attitude.2

As will be seen, the difference between intentional and nonintentional attitudes is related
to that between intensional and extensional verbs, and intentional objects are likewise related to
grammatical objects of intensional verbs.

1.

In this paper I only use the nonepistemic (and transitive) senses of ‘find’ and ‘see,’ that is, not the senses
in ‘I find this topic interesting’ and ‘I see the distinction you are making.’
1

2

Intentional objects, which are hypothesized metaphysical entities, are not to be confused with grammatical
objects which follow intensional transitive verbs and which are linguistic items. In the sentence ‘Sally wants a
horse,’ the indefinite description ‘a horse’ is in the grammatical object position following the intensional verb
‘wants.’
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Suppose that the fastest horse in the corral is Allegro. Then (1) entails that Sally saw
Allegro, but (2) does not entail that she wants Allegro:

(1)

Sally saw the fastest horse in the corral.

(2)

Sally wants the fastest horse in the corral.

Moreover, (3) entails that there is a specific unicorn that Sally bought, yet (4) does not entail that
there is a specific unicorn such that Sally seeks it:

(3)

Sally bought a unicorn.

(4)

Sally seeks a unicorn.

In fact, committing to the truth of (3) commits us to the existence of at least one unicorn,
whereas the truth of (4) is neutral as to the existence of unicorns.
Note that there are two readings of sentences like (4), i.e. sentences of the form ‘S Vs an
F,’ where ‘V’ is an intensional verb and ‘F’ is a common noun. Consider the sentence: ‘Sally
wants a horse.’ On its first, specific reading, the sentence is a consequence of ‘Sally wants
Allegro.’ This mirrors the case with extensional verbs; in fact, this is the only reading for
sentences with extensional verbs: ‘Sally bought a horse’ follows from ‘Sally bought Allegro.’ On
the second, nonspecific reading, there need be no sentence expressing a relation between Sally
and an actual, specific horse, such as ‘Sally wants Allegro,’ from which we can derive ‘Sally
wants a horse.’ For every horse, of all actual horses, it is not true that Sally wants it, specifically,
even though she would be perfectly happy if she could own any of those. In this paper, unless
otherwise specified, I will be discussing only the nonspecific reading of sentences containing
intensional verbs.
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(4), which contains an intensional verb (‘seeks’) and an indefinite description in the
object position (‘a unicorn’), is ambiguous between specific and nonspecific readings, and hence
by itself does not imply the existence of the entities apparently described by the indefinite
description (a unicorn or unicorns).

Sentences like (2) and (4) exhibit the linguistic phenomenon of intensionality, which is
often described in terms of failures of extensionality, namely failure of existential generalization
and/or lack of specificity (as in (4)), and failure of substitution of coextensive terms to preserve
truth value (as in (2), where ‘Allegro’ and ‘the fastest horse in the corral’ are coextensive).
For the restricted cases of intentionality considered in this paper, i.e. those of searches,
intentionality goes hand in hand with intensionality: the intensionality of an expression of search
is explained, in part, by the intentionality of the search, and the mental phenomenon of
intentionality may only be examined via its linguistic reports.

Despite the nonextensionality, the following inferences involving intensional verbs
appear to be valid nonetheless:

(5)

Sally is looking for a unicorn.
Therefore, she is looking for something, i.e. there is something she is looking for.
Sally is looking for a round square cupola.
Therefore, she is looking for something.3

3

This is not the same as to say that if Sally is looking for a round square cupola, then there is such a thing
as a round square cupola, period. I do not deny the nonexistence of impossible objects, or the nonexistence of
merely possible objects in the actual world. The problem becomes interesting precisely when these purportedly
nonexistent objects feature as the objects of searches.
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(6)

Sally is looking for a blue unicorn.
Therefore, the unicorn she is looking for must be blue.
Sally is looking for a round square cupola.
Therefore, the cupola she is looking for must be round and square.

(7)

Sally is looking for a gorgon and a unicorn.
Therefore, she is looking for two different things (or kinds of thing).

(8)

Sally is looking for a unicorn, and John is looking for a unicorn.
Therefore, Sally and John are looking for the same thing (or kind of thing).

Existential claims like (5) and modal claims like (6) seem to be true. Furthermore, each of the
search acts in (7) and (8) appears to be distinct or similar, which suggests that there must be
something that provides a basis for comparison, even though gorgons and unicorns do not exist.
It is therefore tempting to say that there is some thing we are talking about when we make these
claims, that some entity really fills in the theoretical role that we have labeled the intentional
object. We are thus posed with a twofold puzzle: to account for the semantics of the grammatical
objects of the intensional verbs in the above claims, and to account for the metaphysical nature
of the intentional objects that the italicized phrases apparently describe.

2.

Different elements in the puzzle will determine what an analysis of intentional attitudes,
via an analysis of statements containing intensional verbs, must account for, namely the different
types of intentional attitudes, different metaphysical statuses of intentional objects, and different
linguistic descriptions of intentional objects.
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Intensional verbs may be divided into propositional attitude verbs (e.g. ‘believe,’
‘doubt’) and intensional transitive verbs (‘want,’ ‘seek’), which respectively express
propositional attitudes (believing, doubting) and objectual attitudes (wanting, seeking). The
distinction between propositional and objectual attitudes is thus related to a linguistic distinction:
propositional attitude verbs typically take ‘that’-clause complements, e.g. the italicized phrase in
‘Quine doubts that Ralph wants a sloop,’ whereas intensional transitive verbs typically take noun
phrase complements, e.g. as in ‘Ralph wants a sloop.’4
Objectual attitudes may be divided into three broad types: fulfillment-based (e.g. wanting,
seeking); evaluation-based (e.g. liking, fearing, worshipping); and depiction-based (e.g.
imagining, drawing, resembling). This paper will only concern fulfillment-based objectual
attitudes, and the intensional transitive verbs that express them. In what follows I will generally
use searches and seek verbs, but the account should be extendable to desires and want verbs.

Four types of entities may be at least theoretically involved in intentional attitudes, each
of which can be expressed by a proper name, a definite description, or an indefinite description:
ordinary concrete objects (‘Allegro,’ ‘the fastest horse in the corral,’ ‘a horse’); merely possible
(possible but not actual) concrete objects, including mythical and fictional objects (‘Pegasus,’
‘the horse that Bellerophon rides,’ ‘a winged horse’); abstract objects (‘the original proof of
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem,’ ‘a prime number’); and impossible objects (‘Sylvan’s
Box,’5 ‘the round square cupola on Berkeley College,’ ‘a round square cupola’).6

4

The examples are from Salmon (2005), who was recycling examples from Quine (1956).

Sylvan’s Box is a contradictory box in Graham Priest’s short story (1997). It both contains a statue and is
entirely empty.
5
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Abstract objects, impossible objects, proper names, and definite descriptions raise
problems which go beyond the scope of this paper, which will only focus on cases of nonspecific
searches for ordinary or merely possible concrete objects described by indefinite descriptions.

As hinted at the end of the last subsection, two separate, though related, issues need to be
further distinguished, namely the semantic problem of what the semantic contribution of ‘a
horse’ is to the meaning of the sentence ‘Sally seeks a horse,’ and the metaphysical problem of
whether Sally is in a relation to any sort of entity, and if so, what sort of entity that may be, when
we say truly that Sally seeks a horse.
The semantic problem is concerned with the linguistic expression ‘Sally seeks a horse,’
as it asks, for example, under what conditions or in what situations it would be true, and what the
quantified expression ‘a horse’ contributes to the sentence, given that the meaning of the
sentence is a function of the semantic values of its components. The metaphysical problem is
concerned with the nature of the situation in which Sally wants a horse; it asks what such a
situation consists of, what, if any, entities are involved.

The aim of this paper is to propose an answer to the metaphysical problem, of which
there are two sub-issues: first, whether an appropriate description of the situation would refer to
some sort of relation that the searcher is in; second, if so, what entities the searcher is thereby

6

Here are slightly more detailed, albeit still crude, definitions: Abstract objects are neither spatial nor
temporal. Concrete objects are spatial or temporal or causally efficacious. What I later call “physical objects” are
spatiotemporal and causally efficacious objects, which are completely determinate. Ordinary concrete objects are
those belonging to actual kinds, which are types of objects with at least one instance in the actual world. Merely
possible concrete objects belong to merely possible kinds, types of objects without actual instances. Impossible
objects belong to “kinds” with no instances in any possible world.

Pham 8
related to, and if not, then whether a description of the situation could be exhausted by stating
some sort of property that the searcher has or state that the searcher is in.

I will call the positive answer to the first sub-issue relationalism, according to which
intentional objects are ontological entities, whatever metaphysical status they may have. The
negative answer constitutes antirelationalism.7

II.

This section will be an argument for a particular variety of relationalism, namely realism.
I will first challenge the argument against relationalism, before turning to my criticisms of two
antirelationalist and three relationalist accounts, and finally to two further arguments in favor of
realist relationalism.

1.

Antirelationalism about intentional attitudes, in the way I define it, is a negative thesis:
there is no real relation to an object that the searcher is in by virtue of being in a searching
attitude (though there may be a linguistic relation between the grammatical subject, which refers
to the searcher, and the grammatical object of the search verb); there are, therefore, no such
entities as intentional objects of nonspecific searches. Intentional objects are at best our
theoretical label for part of the descriptions of intentional attitudes.

Compare Uriah Kriegel’s taxonomy (2008:83-85): Relationalist views correspond to what Kriegel calls
“act-object theories”; in particular, realism and idealism on my account correspond to the “existent-object views,”
and Meinongianism to the “object view.” Kriegel’s “adverbialism” is one version of antirelationalism.
7
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In a way, antirelationalism is nominalism about intentional objects: the antirelationalist
either rejects that the statements (5)-(8) are true, or accepts the truth of these statements, but only
as nonliteral paraphrases of other statements that do not imply an ontological commitment to
intentional objects.

The negative argument against relationalism can be put in the form of an argument by
reductio, informally as follows: There can be searches that involve nonexistent “things”
(properties etc.), but there cannot be relations to nonexistent things. If searches were relational,
i.e. if to search for something were to be in a relation to that thing, then searches for nonexistent
things would involve relations to nonexistent things, which would be absurd. And the case of
searches for nonexistent things generalizes to all searches. Therefore, searching attitudes cannot
involve relations to anything.8

In other words, relationalists are faced with a dilemma: they must either deny that there
can be searches for nonexistent things, or accept that there are nonexistent things (and hence
there can be relations to, including searches for, nonexistent things). Both horns of the dilemma
seem absurd: we do think about and search for things that do not exist, and all the things that are
cannot include nonexistent things.9 The relationalist assumption must, therefore, be false.

The argument as formulated above presents relationalism as implying an obvious
contradiction, namely that there exist things that do not exist. Such a contradiction is an
inevitable conclusion given the assumption which the antirelationalist takes to be
uncontroversial: that there can be searches for nonexistent things. Yet the move from searches
8

See a formalization in Kriegel (2011:159).

9

Compare Tim Crane’s formulation of essentially the same dilemma (2001:340, 342).

Pham 10
for nonexistent things to search-relations to nonexistent things attributes to relationalism the
equation of objects of search (sought-objects) with objects “in the world,” i.e. actual and merely
possible concrete objects (found-objects). It is one thing (A) to be looking for round square
cupolas and for round square cupolas to not exist; it is another thing (B) to say that one who
looks for a round square cupola is looking for a nonexistent thing. To be clear: it is one thing to
hold that (A) to search for a sought-object is to be in a relation to that sought-object, while the
sought-object has no corresponding found-object; it is quite another thing to hold that (B) to
search for such a sought-object is to be in a relation to the nonexistent found-object (or, what is
equally problematic, to be in a relation to no object). Since (A) does not entail (B), the absurdity
of (B) does not refute (A).

What the antirelationalist argument ascribes to relationalism amounts to the latter, (B),
which indeed would be problematic. As will become clear in the next subsection, while some
relationalist views may involve commitment to nonexistent objects, it is not the only possible
relationalist strategy. Not all relationalist views hold that sought-objects are found-objects.

Three paragraphs from Gilbert Harman, which make what he considers all the same
point, illustrate how one can be confused between the searched for and the found: “There is no
such thing as a Fountain of Youth, but that does not mean Ponce de Leon wasn’t looking for
anything. He was looking for something. . .His search had an intentional object. But the thing
that he was looking for, the intentional object of his search, did not (and does not) exist”
(1990:34, emphases mine). The italicized claims respectively say (A) that there was an object of
the search, but (B) that the object of the search did not exist. It should rather read: “there was a
sought-object, but no found-object.”
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Harman goes on in the next paragraph: “A painting of a unicorn is a painting of
something; it has a certain content. But the content does not correspond to anything actual; the
thing that the painting represents does not exist. . .The content is not actual; the object pictured,
the intentional object of the picturing, does not exist. It is only an intentional object” (34,
emphases mine).10 Although I have not discussed depiction-based attitudes, what Harman calls
the “content” of a painting would be what I call the intentional “object” of the painting. Three
claims should be distinct: (A) that the object painted, the represented or “found” object does not
exist; (B) that the intentional object of the painting, the “searched for” object, does not exist; and
(C) that the painting, the representing or “searching” does not exist. Harman seems to be
asserting, in one sentence or another, all of (A), (B), and (C). Relationalism makes the claim (A),
but denies the claims (B) and (C).
The general positive thesis of antirelationalism states that nonexistent “things” or
properties “figure” nonrelationally in the X of searching attitudes, where X is different for
different accounts. According to adverbialism, X is the intentional type or mode. According to
representationalism, X is the intentional content. One species of representationalism,
propositionalism, takes X to be the intentional attitude’s propositional content.
Adverbialism

Adverbialism is the position that there is no object of search but only a mode of
searching. There is no entity that the intentional attitude is directed upon, but only its mode, type
or way; there is nothing that the attitudes are about but only what they are like. As Uriah Kriegel

Harman appears to use ‘intentional object’ as I do, i.e. to stand for “the thing that [Ponce de Leon] was
looking for” (34). The quote demonstrates Harman’s representationalism (see below).
10
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puts it: “For any x, representing x does not involve constitutively bearing a representation
relation to x; what it involves constitutively is representing x-wise” (2008:84). To seek a unicorn
is to seek unicorn-wise and to hallucinate a tree is to hallucinate tree-wise, with ‘unicorn-wise’
and ‘tree-wise’ being adverbial modifiers of the states ‘seeking’ and ‘hallucinating.’
The main challenge for an adverbial theory is the loss of compositionality or
analyzability. To adapt from Kriegel’s discussion (2011:161-162): Adverbialism has difficulty
accounting for the inference from ‘I am seeking white-horse-wise’ to ‘I am seeking horse-wise,’
since ‘horse-wise’ is only a “morphological [not syntactic] component” of the “syntactically
simple” ‘white-horse-wise’ (162). Kriegel proposes that “principles” like the following be added:
that the property of seeking horse-wise is “a genus, or determinable” of which the property of
seeking white-horse-wise is “a species, or determinate” (163). That is, in the same way that we
have in our language the postulate that whatever is a strawberry is a berry, we now add to it the
postulate that whatever is white-horse-wise seeking is horse-wise seeking. Adverbial modifiers
such as ‘white-horse-wise’ remain syntactically simple, and properties such as seeking whitehorse-wise remain metaphysically simple.

Supplementing our language in this way, whether ad hoc or systematically, would
exponentially multiply the number of meaning postulates: not only by the great number of
adjectives that can modify the great number of nouns, but also by the great number of possible
intentional attitudes. Yet there is more to natural language than just adjectives modifying nouns:
the paraphrase language must be able to allow all possible semantic inferences, including, for
another example, that from ‘I am seeking two-horses-wise’ to ‘I am seeking at-least-one-horsewise.’ In order for the paraphrase language to behave logically and semantically the same as our
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ordinary language, the paraphrase-language postulates must mirror most if not all of the meaning
postulates of English—to such an extent that these adverbial modifiers seem just as committed to
ontological entities as English seems to be. Just as we refer to horses in speaking English in
order to count them, so the adverbial modifiers ‘two-horses-wise’ and ‘at-least-one-horse-wise,’
whose semantics enables “counting” and which look like English except for the hyphens and the
suffix ‘-wise,’ seem just as capable of referring to horses.
Representationalism

Representationalism is the position that an intentional attitude has no ontological,
substantial entity as its object but only some representation as its content. What I have in mind is
Tim Crane’s version. Crane argues that the intentional “object” of an intentional attitude is (a)
what the attitude is about, “what is represented by the mind,” (b) not some sort of entity in itself,
but (c) an object-for-a-subject (e.g. 2001:342, 2013:92-93). The “aboutness” of an intentional
attitude is not constituted by a relation to some entity, but by the representational content it has.11
The putative entity X that we may read into the intentional attitude of seeking X is, roughly, a
“feature,” indicated by the subscript, of the search’s representational content YX, such that the
search is “about” X only by virtue of its having the content YX. As Crane puts it in terms of
thought: “Thoughts have contents, and it is because of this that they are about their objects”
(2001:348).

It is unclear what Crane means by (a), other than that intentional objects are a sort of
representational content; yet he takes the notion of representation to be “basic” i.e. undefinable
Crane’s representationalism is antirelationalist: “[Intentional phenomena, reported by intensional
transitive verbs, such as] fear, expectation, imagining, etc. . .provide cases of superficially relational structures
which cannot really be so” (2013:116). See also the dilemma he uses to undermine relationalism (fn.9).
11
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(2013:116-117). Declaring that there is not much to say about representation only defers
answering questions about the account. It is not clear, first, in what sense the representational
content YX “contains” (represents or stands for) X, and how a search’s being about X by having
YX does not constitute some sort of relation to X. Second, it is not clear whether being “for” a
subject, which by the third definition (c) constitutes what the object is, is a property or
alternatively a sort of relation to the subject, and how the definition avoids substantial
conceptions of such subjects and objects. If being-for constitutes only a property of the object,
and subjects and objects are not to be construed as ontological entities, little will we have to say
about them besides talking about representers and representeds.

Propositionalism

A species of representationalism, propositionalism is the view that all intentional attitudes
can be described linguistically as propositional attitudes, attitudes whose content is a proposition:
just as a belief is a belief that something is the case, so a desire is not a desire for something but
a desire that something be the case, a search is a search that something be the case, and so on.
Propositionalism is thus an attempt to unify the linguistic analysis of intensionality by applying
the same sentential strategy to intensional verbs that appear on the grammatical surface to be
nonpropositional, in particular by uncovering an embedded verb clause. Thus, ‘I seek a unicorn’
is really ‘I try to find a unicorn,’ or ‘I try that I find a unicorn.’
Despite the temptation to read ‘belief that’ or ‘desire that’ as indicating a relation
between a believer or desirer and a proposition, propositionalism as presented here does not
count as a relationalist view, but rather is more a representationalist, content-based account,
where content is propositional content. For some proposition p, ‘desire that p,’ which expresses a
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subject S’s propositional desire, is ambiguous between ‘desire that p’ and ‘desire that-p.’ The
former expresses a desire that p be the case, whereas the latter expresses a desire for the
proposition p and hence implies a relation between S and p. In the former case, the proposition p
is the content of the desire, whereas in the latter it is the object of the desire. The distinction
between desiring that p and desiring the proposition that p parallels the distinction between
believing that p and believing the proposition that p.

Propositionalism as a linguistic position has been criticized by many, mostly on account
of the observation that there is no non-ad hoc way of applying a propositionalist analysis for all
intensional transitive verbs that preserves the semantics and logic of the original expressions. For
example, even though a clausal analysis of ‘seek’ seems syntactically plausible, when applied
across the board it erases the important lexical differences between various search verbs:
translating all search attitudes into ‘try to find’ overlooks the nuanced differences in meaning
between the various search behaviors, e.g. ‘look for,’ ‘search for,’ ‘hunt for,’ and ‘rummage
about for’ (Partee 97). The overgeneralization problem lies in the systematic reduction of the
similarity in intensional behavior between propositional attitude verbs and intensional transitive
verbs into their syntactical equivalence, the process of which necessarily cannot accommodate
all semantic features. Moreover, there are intensional transitive verbs for which it seems
impossible to reveal covert propositional content, such as ‘imagine,’ ‘love,’ and ‘think about.’ A
unified analysis of intensional transitive verbs, therefore, must be nonpropositionalist.12

2.

12

112.

For further criticisms of propositionalism, see Partee 1974:96ff., Forbes 2013:§3, and Crane 2013:109-
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Relationalism is the affirmation of what antirelationalism denies. It is the thesis that
intentional attitudes are relational, and intentional objects are “real”: they are objects in the
ontological sense, and the attitude holder, by virtue of having the intentional attitude, is in a nonnominalist relation with the intentional object of his or her intentional attitude.

There are three main relationalist answers with regard to the nature of intentional objects:
what I call idealism states that they are concrete mental objects, entities inside the searcher’s
head and merely the product of his or her mind; realism states that they are abstract nonmental
objects, some sort of mind-independent entities; and, perhaps most controversially, what has
been labeled in the literature as Meinongianism states that they are nonexistent objects. My
positive account will be a realist view that incorporates certain features of Meinongianism.

Idealism
Idealism claims that intentional objects are mental entities. There may be houses “out
there” in the world, but Sally’s search has as its object the house-idea in Sally’s mind. Objects of
searches are not only “abstract” (in the way that mental representations are “abstract,” i.e.
concrete but not physical), but are essentially private to the searcher. By turning all objects of
search into mental entities, this approach provides a plausible account for searches for merely
possible objects, e.g. unicorns, without invoking a potentially uneconomical ontology.
One argument for idealism may proceed as follows: Let us call Sally’s (specific) search
for Allegro the satisfiable search, and her search for Pegasus the unsatisfiable search. There is no
difference in (or, at least there is something in common between) the nature of Sally’s subjective
experience in the satisfiable case and that of her experience in the unsatisfiable case; in each
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case, for example, she believes that the object of her search exists and that her search is
satisfiable. Presumably what can be said about the one case can also be said about the other. In
both cases, Sally is searching for something. In the unsatisfiable search, what she is searching
for, the intentional object of her search, is not an object in the world (Pegasus does not exist), so
it must be an idea in her mind. Therefore, the intentional object in the satisfiable case is also an
idea in Sally’s mind.
Idealism runs into the immediate objection that one must not confuse things in the world
and the ideas of them; one looks not for an idea of something, but for the thing itself. This is part
of a larger problem not unique to idealism, and will be discussed in §II.3.

Nevertheless, the form of the above argument is reminiscent of that of the argument for
the traditional representative theories of perception, whose troubling conclusion is that all we
perceive when we perceive anything, whether in veridical perception or hallucination, is the
“sense data” of our perceptual experience, not things in the world. A Searlean refutation of the
argument will argue that in the unsatisfiable case, there is nothing that Sally is searching for.13
This contradicts my intuition fact (5) above, and reveals representationalist assumptions, the
criticism of which I will not repeat.

There is, moreover, a fallacy in an assumption of the idealist argument, which is exactly
what I have pointed out as the antirelationalist’s fallacy in rejecting relationalism. According to
the above argument: (a) the object of Sally’s search exists; (b) Pegasus does not exist; therefore
(c) Pegasus is not the object of Sally’s search; therefore (d) the object of her search is some sort
See John Searle’s description of and critique of what he calls the “Bad Argument” for perception,
2015:20-29.
13
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of idea. While I accept the truth of the premises (a)-(b) and the intermediate conclusion (c), I
disagree that the inference to the idealist conclusion (d) is valid. In fact, the argument from (a)(b) to (c) rests on two ambiguities, one of the word ‘exist’ and the other of the name ‘Pegasus.’
(a) As a concrete or abstract object in the world, the object of Sally’s search does exist. (b) As a
concrete object in the actual world, Pegasus does not exist (however we can make sense of
nonexistent statements). (c) The concrete object that Sally cannot find cannot be identical to the
concrete or abstract object that Sally is searching for. Yet the name ‘Pegasus’ refers to both: it
applies to both the nonexistent mythological horse, and the existent intentional object of Sally’s
search. To put it differently, as before, the confusion is between, respectively, the found-object
and the sought-object. While found-Pegasus is not identical to sought-Pegasus, the fact that there
is no found-Pegasus does not entail that there is no sought-Pegasus or that, contrary to idealism,
the sought-Pegasus must be the Pegasus-idea.

Meinongianism

Meinongianism, or nonexistent-object theory, is a double thesis. First, it states that there
are objects with a sole property (or only two properties, and so on), such as the object blue,
which has the property of being blue as its only property, even if naturally all blue things are
extended things made out of certain materials etc. These are incompletely determined or
incomplete objects. Second, Meinongians claim that the unextended object blue, and other such
objects, are necessarily nonexistent (Reicher 2014:§4).

The argument that leads one to Meinongianism about intentional objects presumably has
the same form as that for idealism, but a different interpretation of the conclusion: Sally is
looking for a round square cupola; there is an object of her search, which is a round square
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cupola; round square cupolas are necessarily nonexistent; therefore, the object of her search is
necessarily nonexistent. While idealists take this conclusion to be a clue to look elsewhere for
candidates for sought-objects, Meinongians take the conclusion literally as saying the soughtobject is a necessarily nonexistent entity. The argument generalizes from searches for impossible
objects to all searches.

Meinongianism has come under much criticism, most notably those against its
implication that there are things that do not exist. I will grant the opponent of Meinongianism
this truism: there is no difference between things that exist and things that are; all things that
exist are all things that are. Nonetheless, the objects posited in the first Meinongian thesis may
not be so objectionable. In the final section of this paper, I will propose a way to make sense of
quasi-Meinongian objects.

However, for the third time, I will point at the sought-found fallacy in the above
argument: what does not exist is the found-object, not (necessarily) the sought-object. Any
theory that proposes that the sought-object is the found-object will have to provide an additional
argument for it. In what follows I will describe one such theory, namely satisfaction-based
theories, where the sought-object is taken to be the found-object in a possible situation of
satisfaction.

Realism
According to the realist, objects of searches exist “outside of” individual minds; they are
real, nonmental, public entities that multiple searchers can enter into a relation with. Since the
objects of nonspecific searches are not particular objects, and in many cases are merely possible,
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they cannot be concrete objects, even if the things found in successful searches will be concrete.
Hence the realist’s intentional objects are abstracta.
Different realist approaches provide different accounts of what particular sort of abstracta
these are. I will describe one such account, the satisfaction-based analysis, according to which
intentional objects are entities in possible situations of satisfaction. Along with propositionalism,
satisfaction-based accounts are approaches to objects of intentional attitudes via linguistic
analyses of complements of intensional verbs.

Satisfaction-based analyses build on the classic semantic analysis proposed by Richard
Montague. According to Montague, and as characterized in Richard (2001:108-109), Moltmann
(2013:175-176), and Soames (2010:68ff.):

Under a specific reading, a transitive verb names a relation between the extension of the
grammatical subject and the extension of the grammatical object. Under a nonspecific reading, it
names a relation between the extension of the grammatical subject and the intension of the
grammatical object. The following are rough translations:

Sally seeks a house.
specific: x (x is a house & sally seeks x)
nonspecific: sally seeks q
where q is a term that expresses the intension of ‘a house’.
The extension of a noun phrase, in either subject or object position, in function terms, is a
function from {functions from individuals to truth values} to truth values. In set terms, a noun
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phrase denotes a set of sets of individuals.14 For example, ‘a house’ denotes the set of sets which
have a non-empty intersection with the set of houses. The intension of a noun phrase is a
function taking a possible world and returning the noun phrase’s extension in that world, i.e. a
function from possible worlds to {functions from [functions from individuals to truth values] to
truth values}.
Montague’s analysis thus appears to present a relationalist picture of searching, desiring
etc., in which the searcher, desirer etc. is in a relation with a complex functional object.
Friederike Moltmann shows that this interpretation of the analysis faces the Substitution Problem
(2013:177-178; see also 2013:105-107): if the object noun phrase ‘a house’ in ‘Sally seeks a
house’ is such and such a function, then the sentence seems equivalent to ‘Sally seeks such and
such a function.’ The latter at least sounds awkward, if not false. However, Moltmann’s criticism
overlooks a distinction between semantic (non-ontological) objects such as functions, and
metaphysical objects (ontological entities) such as individuals and sets. Functional objects may
not be the right candidate for intentional objects, but Montague’s analysis does not imply that
they are. It is perhaps less unfair to say that Montague would respond to the puzzle about
intentional objects by saying, rather, ‘Sally seeks such and such a set.’
Mark Richard’s satisfaction-based account describes one type of set as part of the search
situation—or, in his terminology, a success-based account of the hunt. The analysis goes along
these lines (e.g. Richard 2001:116): ‘John hunts a horse’ is true if and only if for some hunt h,
‘John’ names the agent of h, and h demands the intension of ‘a horse’. That is, ‘a horse’

14

The interchangeability between function-talk and set-talk is due to characteristic functions: A function
from a domain to truth values corresponds to the subset of the domain for whose members the function returns the
value TRUE. The function is known as the characteristic function of that subset.
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determines the property ‘horse’, and for every relevant success story <w,s> for h (a situation w
where the hunt is satisfied by the set s of things found), the set of things found because they have
the property ‘horse’ is in the extension of ‘a horse’ at w. Like Montague, Richard would consider
what I call intentional objects to be intensions of quantified noun phrases like ‘a horse,’ which
according to my distinction above are a particular type of ontological entities, namely sets of sets
of individuals in possible situations.

What I agree with in the satisfaction-based theory, to use my terminology, is that there is
a clear separation between the sought-object and the found-object. The found-object does not
exist in the present situation of the search, from which it does not follow that there is no soughtobject. However, I reject the consequence of this view that searches without success stories, i.e.
impossible searches, are without objects. Furthermore, because the noun phrase complement of
the intensional verb is nonreferential, satisfaction-based theories15 do not provide a
straightforward answer to the question: What is the object of Sally’s search?
3.

My defense of realist relationalism so far has been presented negatively via: an objection
to the argument against relationalism; objections to various positive accounts of intentional
objects, including adverbialism, representationalism, propositionalism, idealism and
Meinongianism; and a worry that satisfaction-based realism offers an incomplete account. In this
subsection I will present two further arguments both in favor of realist relationalism and against
the other accounts: an argument from the problem of first-person account, and an argument from
problems of individuation and comparison.
15

presented here as relationalist theories
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First, any theory that states that the searcher is really searching for something other than
what she takes herself to be searching for will face the problem of first-person account, the
problem that the theory provides a radically different, presumably objective answer that is at
odds with what is described by subjective experience. For any proposal for the nature of
intentional objects of search, somebody is bound to resist: “But I am not looking for that!”
Antirelationalism tells us that when we go looking for something, we are not looking for
anything, but are only, and roughly, in a “searching mode.” The “objects” of our searches and
desires have to be revealed to be contrary to what we think: they are in fact no objects at all, not
ontological entities but only some sort of mental content or manner. Likewise, Meinongianism
would be highly counterintuitive: we do not take ourselves to be looking for nonexistent objects,
or we would not go looking at all.
Moreover, the kind of conflation of objects in the world with objects “in the head” that
idealism maintains presents philosophy’s familiar problem: If we adopt an imagistic conception
of ideas, so that an idea of Allegro is some sort of mental image of Allegro, then it would be a
mistake to confuse something with the idea of it, just as it would be silly to take a painting of a
horse to be a real horse. Alternatively, if we take the idea of Allegro to be some sort of verbal
description or mental representation of Allegro, then although Allegro may be mentioned in the
description or featured in the representation, it is not itself the description or the representation.
To quote Harman: “[Ponce de Leon] was not looking for an idea of the Fountain of Youth. He
already had the idea. What he wanted was a real Fountain of Youth, not just the idea of such a
thing”, but what the idea was of (1990:36). A representing is not identical to the represented.
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In terms of capturing our pre-theoretical intuitions, of all the theories presented so far,
satisfaction-based realism seems to offer the most agreeable account: I am looking for
something, such that when my search is successful, I will have found such-and-such.

Nevertheless, any appeal to common sense as an additional basis for arbitrating between
different theories—that is, the position that all else being equal, we should go with the view that
best agrees with our intuitions—only constitutes a weak argument in favor of any view. Yet,
where there remains objection to counterintuitiveness, we must distinguish between two senses
of searching: the de dicto, subjective or first-person sense, what the person claims that they are
doing or takes themselves to be doing; and the de re, objective or third-person sense, what the
person is really doing. As I grab the glass on the table, I may be taking myself, in the de dicto
sense, to be trying to drink a glass of milk, while I am in fact trying, in the de re sense, to drink a
glass of white paint.16 Whatever we may take ourselves to be doing, whatever we feel that or
think we know that we are doing, may well not be what we are in fact doing.

A support for such a divergence between first- and third-person accounts is the
observation that even what we take ourselves to be looking for may often be contradictory: Sally,
who is a confirmed nominalist about universals and abstract objects, may claim to be looking not
for a universal house, but for a particular one. Yet upon more philosophical reflection, she may
come to believe that she is not looking for any particular object. If such a situation is possible,
then first-person accounts may themselves be confused and mistaken. At least insofar as our
intuition about the objects of our searches and desires is concerned, just as intuitiveness should
not be a strong reason to adopt any metaphysical theory, i.e. a theory should not be preferable
16

The example is from Nicholas J. J. Smith (379).
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only because it appears more intuitive, so counterintuitiveness should not count as a strong
reason against any theory, either, i.e. a theory should not be objectionable only because it
appears more counterintuitive.

The second set of problems for theories of intentional objects involves resemblance, in
particular the problem of accounting for the possibility of comparison and individuation as in
(7)-(8). To expand from (7)-(8), the following list the minimum resemblance facts which call for
explanation:

(9)

A white-horse search is more similar to a horse search than to a house search.

(10) A unicorn search is more similar to a winged-horse search than to a gorgon search.
(11) Sally’s house search has something in common with John’s house search.
(12) Sally’s house search in 2012 has something in common with her house search in
2015.
Moreover, we also need to account for the possibility of likening or juxtaposing objects
of search with objects found in successful searches, i.e. sought-objects with found-objects:

(13) What Sally found was exactly/hardly/almost etc. what she was looking for.
An advantage of Meinongianism over realism about intentional objects is that
Meinongian objects, entities like the object blue, are simple enough, i.e. have clear identity and
individuation conditions, that the theory is able to straightforwardly account for the above
explananda. Realism is in turn superior to idealism, since entities “in the world” (in possible
situations) have clearer identity and individuation conditions than ideas or mental entities. Such a
hierarchical advantage of the objects in one theory over another is due to the degree of
complexity of the properties which each theory grants its intentional objects: Meinongian objects
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have the absolute minimum of properties, realist objects are more or less full-blown objects,
whereas ideas have the most obscure properties.

I thus propose in my account to keep the gist of one promising Meinongian idea, namely
the first thesis about the minimal properties of incompletely determined objects. Like
Meinongian objects and unlike ordinary objects, intentional objects on my account have only
certain determinate properties but not others. Unlike Meinongian objects, however, they have
more than just the one (two etc.) properties characterized in their names. And finally, unlike
Meinongian objects, and like realist objects, they exist nonetheless.

III.

While the incapacity to solve the two sets of problems in the last subsection offers no
decisive reason to reject any of the accounts so far explicated, realist relationalism has been
shown to be more promising as far as explanatory power goes. This third and final section will
fill in the details of one species of realism inspired by the satisfaction-based theory’s use of
possible situations and the nonexistent-object theory’s notion of incompletely determined
objects. So I present my theory of incomplete objects.

1.

Let us provide general forms for the explananda (5)-(8) in §I.1. The puzzle of intentional
objects is the challenge to provide an adequate theory that captures the intuitive truth of the
following claims:

(14) If S seeks an H, then there is something that S seeks.
(15) If S seeks an H that Fs, then the H that S seeks must F.
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(16) If S seeks an H and a G, then S seeks two things.
(17) If S1 seeks an H, and S2 seeks an H, then S1 and S2 seek the same thing.
where H and G stand for different nouns or noun phrases, and it is either not necessarily true, or
necessarily true but not analytically or a priori, that all and only Hs are Gs.17

When a subject S is looking for something nonspecific, S is in a relation with that object
of S’s search, which is an entity that:
(i)

exists (given 14);

(ii)

is abstract;

(iii) has all the properties that the searcher requires (given 15); and
(iv) has only the properties that the searcher requires, plus all those implied by these.
(i) and (ii) are characteristic of a realist account; in honor of what (iv) implies, I will
name the intentional objects as postulated in my account incomplete objects. I will use
“complete” and “incomplete” as short for “completely determinate” and “incompletely
determinate.” Being completely determinate in this usage is to satisfy the principle of excluded
middle for all properties; all and only physical objects are complete, such that for any property P,
there is a fact of the matter whether the complete object is P or not P. Incomplete objects have
determinate properties relevant to the search, but are not determinate with regard to all the other
properties: for some irrelevant property P, there is no fact of the matter whether the incomplete
object is P or not P. To be clear, incomplete objects are intentional objects or sought-objects
according to my account; as success reports like (13) show, they may or may not have
corresponding found-objects, which would be complete.

So H and G can be ‘a creature with a heart’ and ‘a creature with a kidney,’ or ‘water’ and ‘H2O,’ or
‘Superman’ and Clark Kent,’ but not ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man.’
17
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Incomplete objects may strike us as a superfluous addition to our common sense
ontology, yet it is not the sheer presence of these extra sorts of entities that is potentially
problematic, but how they may be identified, individuated and described. (16) and (17) give
preliminary constraints on how these sought-objects are to be individuated or identified by their
properties. Without identity or individuation conditions, we would not be able to say that Sally is
looking for a unicorn, not a gorgon.

Given only the four theses (i)-(iv) above, contradictions immediately arise:

(18) Sally is looking for a concrete house.
The house Sally is looking for is abstract. (from ii)
The house Sally is looking for must be concrete. (from iii and 15)
(19) Sally is looking for a physical i.e. complete house.
The house Sally is looking for is not complete. (from iv)
The house Sally is looking for must be complete. (from iii and 15)
Thus, in addition to the claims of existence (14), of resemblance (9)-(12) and (16)-(17),
of search success (13), and of search requirements (15), the explananda thus far include these
contradictory statements (18)-(19). This subsection has asserted the existence of intentional
entities (i), which enter in the search relations established in §II. The next subsection will
provide an account of the properties of incomplete objects as intentional objects, thereby making
better sense of the theses (ii)-(iv) to explain the claims of search resemblance and search success.
The final subsection will elaborate on the properties of incomplete objects as regards search
requirements and explain away the apparent contradictions in (18) and (19).

2.
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There are different types or levels of properties.18 Metaphysical properties are properties
such as existence, concreteness, abstractness, incompleteness, and self-identity. Natural
properties are properties such as being an animal, being a horse, having a color, being blue all
over, being searched for by Sally, being a present for Sally’s brother, and so on. Natural
properties can be more generic or more specific; for example, having extension is more generic
than being three feet long.

Natural properties can also be prior or posterior. Prior properties are properties that
something has before the conclusion of the search, e.g. being the fastest horse in the corral.
Posterior properties are properties that something acquires by virtue of or as a result of
satisfying the search, e.g. being the new chairperson.

There are an infinite number of prior and posterior properties, both of which may be
generic or specific. Posterior properties solve the (not aforementioned) problem of whether the
incomplete object of John’s search for a new secretary has, already, the property of being the
office’s newly appointed secretary. John looks for promising candidates (or so we say; really, he
is looking for one incomplete object), and only when he has decided on the most suitable
(complete) person for the job does he then appoint the person to be his secretary. Similarly, the
incomplete object of Sally’s search for a present for her brother is not the present for her brother,
but only its complete version will be.

18

Meinongians make various kinds of property distinctions, e.g. between characterizing and noncharacterizing properties, between nuclear and non-nuclear properties, or between determinables and determinates
(for an overview, see Nelson 2012:§2). These distinctions approximate the (nonbinary) distinction between generic
and specific properties that I make within natural properties.
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Incomplete objects, as opposed to complete objects, have some determinate properties
but not others:

(v)

The object of search has metaphysical properties, and all and only the natural
properties demanded by or implied by the search, but no posterior properties.

Nonetheless, incomplete objects have the same identity condition as complete objects do, by the
principle of identity of indiscernibles: for any two objects of search x and y, if, for every property
P, x has P iff y has P, then x is identical to y. This applies to comparison between searches:

(vi) A search for x and a search for y are searches for the same thing iff for all
metaphysical and natural properties P, x has P iff y has P.
(vii) Objects of different searches are of the same kind iff they share at least some
natural properties.
The relation of property implication will involve more than just logical implication. For example,
the property of being blue all over implies the property of being not red all over.

Thus the resemblance explananda (9)-(12) may be explained: it is by virtue of the natural
properties that incomplete objects may be similar or different. If Sally and John are both looking
for a secretary, without any further requirement, then they are each in a relation to one and the
same incomplete object, namely the incomplete object that has the properties of being19 a
secretary, being a human being, and so on. If Sally specifies that she wants a French secretary,
while John wants a German-speaking one, then Sally and John are looking for the same kind of
incomplete object, since their incomplete objects of search share at least the property of being a

19

or more accurately, the properties of being required to be so and so. This refinement for natural
properties of intentional objects will be made in §III.3.
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secretary. Their sought-objects are not the same particular incomplete object as they do not
share in all their natural properties. Just as it will be vague to say whether a concrete horse can be
said to be of the same kind as a concrete book, so it will remain vague as to which common
properties are sufficient to count two incomplete objects as belonging to the same kind.

As was seen in (v), because no object of a nonspecific search has a completely
determinate set of natural properties, incomplete objects of search i.e. sought-objects are
necessarily incomplete. By contrast, found-objects are determinate as regards all of the prior and
posterior natural properties. The condition for search success, i.e. for “identifying” incomplete
sought-objects with complete found-objects, is as follows:

(viii) An object satisfies a search iff it is complete and has a sufficient number of the
prior natural properties that the incomplete object of the search has.
When Sally looks for a rope, the incomplete rope that she is in a searching relation with
has the (not mutually exclusive) properties of, to list a few, being a rope, having a length, and
existing. When Sally finds a piece of rope, it then has the properties, again to give a
nonexhaustive list, of being six feet long, being found by Sally, being useful in such and such
ways—in addition to the properties it “inherits” from its incomplete version.
Objects of search could acquire more properties as the searcher’s description elaborates,
in the epistemic sense of being revealed to have more and more properties than are previously
known. As the searcher decides on more requirements of search, however, objects of search only
acquire more properties in a metaphorical sense. In fact, when the searcher thinks more about
what she wants for her search, she does not “narrow down” her search by picking out a smaller
set of objects her search, since for every search she is in a search relation with a specific
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incomplete object, not a set of incomplete objects. Rather, she modifies the search by entering
into a search relation with a new incomplete object, which may have all the properties of the
previous sought-object plus the new, added natural properties.

Finally, the condition (viii) for the relation between the sought-object and the foundobject will have to be restated, making use of search requirements, to account for the apparent
contradiction concerning metaphysical properties that the sought-object is abstract and
incomplete, whereas the found-object is concrete and complete.

3.

The theses (iii)-(v) together imply that any object of nonspecific search is incomplete:

For some property P, it is neither the case that it is P, nor the case that it is not P.
We will see how this is not a contradiction of the principle of excluded middle. The thesis
may be spelled out as follows. Just as with complete objects, for an incomplete object i:

(ix) For any property P relevant to the search, i is either P or not P.
But also, and more crucially:

(x)

For some property P not relevant to the search, i is either P or not P, but it is neither
the case that i is P, nor the case that i is not P.

A property P is relevant to the search iff it is either mentioned in the search description,
or implied by those mentioned in the description.20 Assuming the principle of excluded middle,

20

in §II.2.

Relations of property implication may be worked out in better detail using the generic-specific hierarchy
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for every property P, the disjunctive property of being either P or not P is search-relevant, by
virtue of the search object’s being an entity at all, but not necessarily the individual properties of
being P and being not P.
For example, when Sally’s search is described by the sentence ‘Sally is looking for a
green or blue house,’ and she presently has no other requirements in mind, the following
properties are search-relevant, to give a nonexhaustive list: being either a house or not a house;
being a house; being either green or blue; being either green or not green; being either made of
wood or not. By contrast, the following properties are search-irrelevant: being green; being blue;
being made of wood; not being made of wood; and so on.
Call the incomplete object of Sally’s search h (for “house”); h is denoted by ‘the house
that Sally seeks.’ Let us use the notation Pa, for some property P and some (complete or
incomplete) object a, to express ‘a is P.’ Here is an incorrect way to capture (ix)-(x):
Gh  Bh

h is either green or blue

¬Gh

it is not the case that h is green

¬Bh

it is not the case that h is blue

¬(¬Gh)

it is not the case that h is not green

¬(¬Bh)

it is not the case that h is not blue

The above are clearly contradictory in a two-valued, first-order logic. The reason that the above
are wrong is the same reason that (20) is unacceptable while (21) is acceptable:

Sally is looking for a blue unicorn.
(20) The unicorn Sally is looking for is blue.
(21) The unicorn Sally is looking for must be blue.
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Similarly, it is not acceptable to say (22), but acceptable to say (23):

Sally is looking for a green or blue house.
(22) The house Sally is looking for is either green or blue.
(23) The house Sally is looking for must be either green or blue.
As noted in passing by Moltmann (1997:6), with the presence of a wide-scope modal
operator such as ‘must,’ that is, “in the context of modal subordination,” which is another sort of
intensional context, it is possible to neutrally “refer” to the object of search without committing
to the existence of unicorns and green-or-blue houses. To illustrate how a definite description
like ‘the house Sally is looking for’ does not necessarily carry ontological commitment inside a
modal context, notice that (24) is intelligible despite the necessary nonexistence of a round
square (or nonsense of ‘round square’), let alone triangular round ones:
Sally is looking for a triangular round square.
(24) The round square Sally is looking for must be triangular.
The modal context and the notion of search-relevance correspond to the proviso “that the
searcher requires” in (iii) and (iv). Call Rs the sentence operator for Sally’s requirement. Given a
relevant property P and an irrelevant property Q to Sally’s house search:
Rs (Ph  ¬Ph)
Rs Ph Rs¬Ph
Rs (Qh  ¬Qh)
¬Rs Qh  ¬Rs¬Qh
The above claims (ix) and (x) about relevant and irrelevant properties of an object of
search can be formally applied to Sally’s house search, without contradictions, as follows:
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Rs (Gh  Bh)
Rs (Gh  ¬Gh)
¬Rs Gh
¬Rs¬Gh
Rs (Bh  ¬Bh)
¬Rs Bh
¬Rs¬Bh
Rs (Wh  ¬Wh)
¬Rs Wh
¬Rs¬Wh
The formal, though simplified, truth conditions of the search reports are thus, using the
notation Sab to express ‘a seeks b’ (taking ‘seeks’ to be synonymous with ‘is looking for’):
(25) Sally is looking for a blue unicorn.
x (Ssx  Rs Ux  Rs Bx)21
‘Sally is looking for a blue unicorn’ is true iff Sally is in a search relation with an
object x, such that according to her requirements, x is a unicorn and is blue.22
(26) Sally is looking for a green or blue house.
x (Ssx  Rs Hx  Rs (Gx  Bx))
‘Sally is looking for a green or blue house’ is true iff Sally is in a search relation
with an object x, and according to her requirements, x is a house and is either green
or blue.
Compare these truth conditions with those for reports of specific searches:

21

22

ignoring tense

The truth conditions imply that the incomplete objects will have any other properties by virtue of being a
blue unicorn.
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(27) Sally is looking for Allegro.
x (Ssx  Rs x = a)
‘Sally is looking for Allegro’ is true iff Sally is in a search relation with an object x,
such that Sally requires x to be Allegro.
(28) Sally is looking for a house (namely, her brother’s house).
x (Ssx  Rs Hx)
‘Sally is looking for a house’ is true iff Sally is in a search relation with an object x,
such that Sally requires x to be a house.
Note that the truth conditions for ‘Sally is looking for a house’ are exactly the same for both
specific and nonspecific “readings.” The specific reading arises only with an independent piece
of information, or with the reader’s imagination or presumption, that Sally is having a specific
house in mind. The semantics of the sentence describing Sally’s search for a house is exactly the
same whether Sally is looking for a specific house or not.
Thus sentences containing intensional transitive verbs “allow” existential generalization,
in the sense that their logical interpretations contain a wide-scope existential quantifiers. The
things that Sally is looking for, i.e. her sought-objects, exist and have certain properties
according to her search requirements. Even when Allegro is the fastest horse in the corral,
because of Rs, (27) does not necessarily have the same truth value as (29):

(29) Sally is looking for the fastest horse in the corral.
x (Ssx  Rs x = ιyIy)
where ‘ιyIy’ is the iota notation for ‘the unique y such that y is the fastest horse in
the corral’.
Finally, compare the above with the following (again, oversimplified) truth conditions for
sentences containing extensional verbs:
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(30) Sally found Allegro.
x (Fsx  x = a)
‘Sally found Allegro’ is true iff Sally is in a finding relation with an object x,
such that x is Allegro.
The linguistic phenomenon of intensionality is thus a matter of scope ambiguity, and the
source of the intensionality effects is the presence of the operator R. Hence intensional verbs
such as ‘seek’ and ‘want’ are intensional not in the sense that the relations they express, e.g. that
of seeking and wanting, are not relations to specific entities, as those of finding and buying are,
but only in the sense that sentences containing them contain a modal operator that blocks certain
extensionality effects. The operator appears in both the nonspecific and specific readings of
sentences containing intensional verbs. Note that an indefinite description such as ‘a horse,’
which is a quantifier expression, still names no object in either an intensional sentence like ‘Sally
is looking for a horse’ or an extensional sentence like ‘Sally is seeing a horse,’ even though both
sentences are about specific objects (the first one is about an incomplete object with the property
of being required to be a horse, the second one is about, say, Allegro).

We are now in a position to return to the apparent contradictions in (18)-(19). Use A for
“abstract” and C for “concrete.” When Sally seeks a concrete (and complete) house, even if the
requirement is only implicit:
Ah  Rs Ch
Even though by definition, an entity cannot be both abstract and concrete, nor can it be both
incomplete and complete, there is no contradiction in saying both that h is a concrete, complete
object according to Sally’s requirements, and that it is itself an abstract, incomplete object.
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However, we must avoid analyzing R as a metaphysical necessity operator: If it is true
that the house that Sally wants is blue according to Sally’s requirements iff the house Sally
wants must be blue, as (18)-(19) suggest, then for all properties P, Rs Phis logically equivalent
to □Ph. But if, as with metaphysical or epistemic “must,” for any a, □Pa logically implies Pa,
then Rs Pa logically implies Pa. If so, then we are faced again with a contradiction:
Ah  Rs Ch
Ah  □Ch
Ah  Ch
If we are keeping the equivalence between R Pa and □Pa, then we must explain the
logical behavior of the operator R in such a way that □Pa does not entail Pa, for example as in
deontic logic. That is, Sally may require her object of search to be so-and-so, i.e. as in (15) we
may say it “must” be so-and-so, but it need not actually be so-and-so. The incomplete object of
search has such and such natural properties according to the searcher’s requirement, but in itself
it has only the metaphysical properties enumerated in (i)-(ii), such as those of existence,
abstractness and incompleteness. The properties that the incomplete object is said to have in (iii)(v) are to be understood within a requirement context, i.e. inside R’s scope.
The intensional operator R is reminiscent of the intensional operator “in such-and-such
fiction,” call it F, in the literature on fictional truths. Just as a fictional character has both the
metaphysical property of being fictional, plus the properties of being so and so in the fiction, i.e.
as described by the author, so an object of search has the metaphysical property of being
incomplete, plus the properties as required by the searcher. David Lewis suggests that we
analyze F as a “restricted universal quantifier over possible worlds”: “a prefixed sentence ‘In
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fiction f, ϕ’ is true. . .iff ϕ is true at every possible world in a certain set, this set being somehow
determined by the fiction f” (1978:39). We may arrive at a logic in which R Pa is true in our
world iff Pa is true in every accessible possible situation, where the accessibility relation is tied
to search satisfaction and not reflexive: the present situation is not a situation where the search is
satisfied.

There is thus the remaining task of specifying such a set of accessible situations, and of
extending the account to logically impossible objects of search.

*

The account of the intentional objects of objectual attitudes in this paper is a version of
what I have called realist relationalism, the view that a searcher stands in a relation with the
intentional object of his or her search, which is an existent, nonmental, abstract object which has
only the properties required by or implied by the search. I have argued for relationalism both by
presenting further objections to three antirelationalist views, namely adverbialism,
representationalism, and propositionalism, and more crucially by criticizing an argument against
relationalism, by showing that the argument commits a fallacy in assuming that relationalism
requires that the sought-object be the found-object. The arguments for two relationalist views,
namely idealism and Meinongianism, were also rejected on account of their conflation of soughtobjects and found-objects. I then showed that the third relationalist view, realism, in particular
satisfaction-based accounts, allows for an appropriate distinction between sought-objects and
found-objects. My incomplete-object account of intentional objects is based on both satisfactionbased theories and nonexistent-object theories.
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What, then, does Sally look for, when she looks for her dog Fido, for a dog but no
specific one, or Snoopy the dog? My own positive account presents intentional objects of search
as incomplete objects, abstract entities which have only the properties as required by or implied
by the search. The object of Sally’s nonspecific dog search is an incomplete object that is
required to be a dog. The object of her, perhaps confused, Snoopy search is an incomplete object
that is required to be a small, black-and-white, etc. beagle. And when Sally goes looking for
Fido, she is looking for an entity as described by her own characterization of Fido: a dog of a
certain approximate size, which has a certain type of coat of a certain approximate color, which
will respond to her call ‘Fido!’ and so on. There is also a complete, physical entity in the world,
named Fido, which will be the object of her finding.
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